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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOooo-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
s
Case No. 970544-CA
DOUGLAS B. JAMES,
Defendant and Appellant.

Prioritv N

An officer is stopped along the side • :)f the i oad, completing a pi ioi traffic stop
when he was approached by a motorist. The motorist claimed of there being a reckless driver
whom hit or nearly hit three other motorists. The motorist provided a license plate number, a
bncf (Irstiiptiui) oil llir vrtiii lr .mil Us dun linn

hnm Hit pluli unmix i, tin1 officer obtained

an address. While approaching said residence, the officer witnessed the driver pull into his
driveway. W 1 tin. ii :> cii iving pattern established b> the officer :: i 3th si in dependent
observations, the officer blocks the driver in his driveway and initiates contact. There were no
observed signs of physical damage to the vehicle, nor had dispatch conveyed substantiating
reports from others of any alleged hit-and-run. Without probable cause the-driver is seized, to

later determine that the driver may have violated the offense of driving under the influence of
alcohol.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1997)
(2)(3) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of
a first degree or capital felony). The Appellant appeals the final order and judgment of the
First Judicial District Court, in and for Cache County involving his conviction of Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §416-44 (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
(1) Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant
(hereinafter "Mr. James) while in his vehicle?
(2) Whether the officer had probable cause to open Mr. James' door to the
vehicle?
(3) Whether the officers had probable cause to enter into and seize Mr. James
from his house, the garage, without a warrant?
(4) Whether exigent circumstances existed to allow the officers to arrest Mr.
James without a warrant?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(1) - (4) The trial court erred by denying Mr. James' Motion to Suppress
Evidence. The State failed to show reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent
circumstances in this case.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. "We review the
factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a clearly
erroneous standard." State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). We
review the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of those facts for correctness. See

ii

State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an appeal of the Final Judgment and Guilty Verdict of Mr.

James for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor. Mr. James was
acquitted of being in Possession of an Open Container, a Class B Misdemeanor. (R. at 87).
Mr. James motioned the court to suppress evidence twice.1 Both motions were denied.

//.

Course of the Proceedings:
This case went through a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. A Suppression
1

By way of written motion and by oral at time of trial.
3

Hearing was conducted on July 31, 1996 and the court entered a written order denying same.
(R. at 56-58). A trial was set and held on August 7, 1997, where the trial court again denied
Mr. James' motion to suppress and a jury convicted Mr. James of the Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol charge only. (R. at 88-90).

///.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial court denied Mr. James' motions to suppress evidence, the jury found

Mr. James Not Guilty of Possession of an Open Container, but Guilty of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol (hereinafter "DUI"). (R. at 56-58, 87).

IV.

Statement of Facts:

Presented in the Pleadings:
The State conceded to the following facts: (R. at 22-23).2
1. On or about March 16, 1996, Mr. James was arrested for DUI by officers.
2. The basis for Officer Kendricks' initial suspicion was a citizen's complaint that Mr.
James was "all over the road and possibly struck three other vehicles."
3. The citizen provided the officer the license number for said vehicle and the officer
ran the plates to obtain an address.
4. The officer pulled up to said address, he observed Mr. James pulling into his
driveway. Therefore no driving pattern was observed.
This stated added the additional facts in response to Mr. James' motion quoting
2
In the State's Response
to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress,
the State concurred
with the defendant's recital of facts numbered 1 through 4. Also recited herein this brief.

4

from the police report:
Citizen informed me of vehicle direction & license #. Stated was all over road and
possible struck 3 other vehicle. I ran license number & obtained address. As I
approached address, observed suspect pulling into drive. Pulled in behind as suspect
was putting into park (foot on brake). Contacted and removed from vehicle. Observed
alcohol in vehicle, strong odor of alcohol. Obtained driver's license, stumbled through
wallet, dropping other wallet contents. Passenger getting belligerent. I stated to stay
put & went to my vehicle to call for help Suspect entered home & and [sic] had to be
recontacted from home. Very argumentative. . . .
(R. at 43). Mr. James does not stipulate to these facts as they are not an objective
interpretation of the events that truly took place as what was demonstrated in testimony at trial.
Infra.

Adduced from Trial:
On March 16, 1996, Officer Kendricks was working State Road 101, which
goes through Hyrum, through WellsviUe, and all the way up Blacksmith fork Canyon. (R .at
12), when an individual in a blue Dodge Caravan approached him running up behind the
officer. (R. at 13). During their conversation, the individual informed the officer that a
vehicle . . . "struck three vehicles or it had come close but the fact that three vehicles were
almost struck or ran off the road or which, I don't know; that is where it was going, this is the
license plate number, this is the color." And the officer said, "Okay." (R. at 23). Then the
officer concluded his stop and pulled out heading west as directed. (R. at 23, 28, 32-33).3
Subsequently, no independent observation were made by the officer.

3
It was this exclusive information that was the basis for the stop and detention
of Mr. James. (R at 33).

5

While in route, the officer ran the plate through dispatch and obtained the
address of Mr. James. (R. at 24, 34). The address relayed by dispatch was Mr. James' 400
North 89 East, Wellsville. (R. at 35). Upon approach of the address from the east, the officer
observed a vehicle pull into the driveway which would fit the description. (R. at 36). He
pulled in behind the vehicle blocking Mr. James' pick up truck in the driveway. (R. at 36).
The driver of the pickup truck had his brake lights illuminated as the officer pulled in behind
the truck. (R. at 36).
Once there, the officer contacted dispatch reporting that he had arrived and was
to make contact with the driver. (R. at 37). The officer noted that there were two occupants
in the pickup, (r. at 37), a male driver and a female passenger. Later these two were
identified as Mr. James and his significant other. The officer made no observations for
damage to the vehicle, he immediately approached the vehicle driver door only then knocked
on the window. (R. at 38). The officer then opened the door himself. (R. at 38). Once
opened, he observed an open box (a twelve pack of beer), on the passenger side on the floor.
(R. at 38). The box was open; and one container was standing on the floor on the passenger
side. (R. at 38-39, 50). The opening of the door was the officer's exclusive and univited
decision. This information regarding the officer's opening of the door was exculpatory
evidence that was never provided prior to trial; not even at the suppression hearing. (R. at
40).
On voir dire of the officer, it was determined that the pick up was a 1995
Chevrolet pick up truck that had not been modified. (R. at 52-53). Moreover, the officer
could see the couple from the shoulders up. (R. at 54). The officer knocked on the window,
6

paused for a moment, then opened the door. (R. at 54). After which, the officer and Mr.
James walked around the truck and found no damage to the vehicle. (R. at 55). The officer
did not observe or attempt to observe damage to the vehicle prior to making contact with Mr.
James. (R. at 55).
During the contact with Mr. James, the officer noted an odor of alcohol
emitting from the vehicle. (R. at 57). He claimed that Mr. James had slurred, slow speech.
Additionally he remembered, "the flaccid face, the ptosis of the eyes, which is the droopy,
red, bloodshot eyes." (R. at 57). The officer later asked Mr. James if he been drinking, and
Mr. James replied that he had one beer. (R. at 59). The officer also believed that Mr. James
appeared to be unstable and unable to stand straight. (R. at 61).
At this point, the female passenger exited the vehicle and approached the officer
allegedly "letting him have it," (r. at 59), so the officer asked Mr. James to stay put as he
went back to his patrol car to call for help. (R. at 59-60). During this call to dispatch, Mr.
James left his truck and entered his home, but the officer does know when as the truck blocked
his view. (R. at 60). Afterwards, the officer reestablished contact with the female passenger,
(r. at 62), while Mr. James was still in the home. (R. at 63). Then back up arrived
approximately four to six minutes later as two other male individuals exited from the home.
(R. at 62-63).
So the officer approached the home and ordered Mr. James to come out or they
were going to go in. (R. at 64). Upon this threat, Mr. James exited the home into the garage
where he involuntarily submitted to a field test. (R. at 64). At this point, the officer had Mr.
James perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. (R. at 65-69). The officer indicated that Mr.
7

James failed all six points of the test, then Mr. James refused any further tests stating: "Forget
it, I'm not doing your tests." (R. at 72). Immediately thereafter, the officer placed Mr.
James under arrest. (R. at 72).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The officer lacked objective facts based upon his independent observations that
he could articulate to support the claims made by the citizen. As a result, the officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. James. The officer failed to question regarding scope of
the stop regarding reckless driving on State Road 101, and about damage to his vehicle.
The officer lacked probable cause to open the door of Mr. James' vehicle in
order to make contact with Mr. James when Mr. James did not open his truck door upon
contact by the officer.

The opening of the door constituted a search and seizure.

The officers lacked probable cause and exigent circumstances, absent a warrant,
to enter Mr. James' home to arrest Mr. James. Mr. James was in his basement upon second
contact by the officers. Mr. James refused to exit from the kitchen to the garage, and did not
until threatened. Nonetheless, the garage is very much a part of Mr. James' home and he is
entitled to the same constitutional protections regarding the garage as he has to rest of the
dwelling. Hence, the officers could not enter the garage unless they had probable cause with
exigent circumstances, absent a warrant for arrest.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
OFFICER KENDRICKS LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION
TO DETAIN MR. JAMES.
A.

Introduction.
Article I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, (emphasis
added)
Utah Const, art. I § 14.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is identical on content.

B.

A Detention Required Reasonable Suspicion,
The reasonable suspicion standard is to be based on articulable, objective facts

that are to rise to a level upon appellate review that would not result in a close de novo review.
Furthermore, the trial court has little discretion on issues of reasonable suspicion. See State v.
Struhs, supra.
In the 1994 case, State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994), this Court reacknowledged the Utah Supreme Court's three levels of police encounters with the public that
are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his [or her] will; (2) an officer may seize a
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed
or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an
officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being committed." kL; (quoting, State v.
9

Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curium) (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984) cert,
denied sub nom. 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2250 (1986))).
Further, the Bean Court defines a level one stop as:
A voluntary encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but
is free to leave at any time. State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); accord State v. Carter, 821
P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
The Court explained that a "seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street
and questions him, if the person is willing to listen." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). "Such consensual, voluntary discussions between citizens and police
officers are not seizures subject to Fourth Amendment protection." Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768.
In contrast, level two and level three stops are protected by the Fourth Amendment.
[A] level two stop, or a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
occurs when the officer "by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way
restrained the liberty" of a person. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552, 100
S.Ct. 1870, 1876, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88
S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n.16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)); accord, Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87. "When a
reasonable person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of
cooperation with the officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave a
seizure occurs." Trujillo, 739 at 87. "The test for when the seizure occurred is objective and
depends on when the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks
the person is no longer free to leave." Id; (quoting, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786
10

(Utah 1991); accord, Mendenh,

ackso.

767.)
1

'

" -111

light of all other circumstances, tend to indicate a seizure has occurred, [some of which are]:
LiJ the threatening presence of several officers, [2] the display of a weapon by
an officer, [3] physical touching of the person of the citizen, [4] or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 87 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877). (emphasis added)

In Bean, Judge Billings wrote, "[I]t is helpful in this highly factual context to

facts. In Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d 1062 (Utah App. 1990), this court found a level
one stop under circumstances similar to the case at issue

(emphasis added)

In State v. Jackson, this court held that a seizure did not occur when a police
officer stopped his patrol car behind the defendant's parked car, thus blocking it, after the

him for identification. The court concluded that it was a level one encounter, because under
ulstances a reasonabie

person would have believed that he or she was free to leave.

Jackson, 805 P.2d at 768. Further, "a request for identification cannot constitute a show of
authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure. Only when police have in
• way restrained tV lib-

»r.:* individual.

• <>?

there a 'seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment." I d , (quoting United States v.
Castellanos, JM i III ',

t|i|i I

'

HI I "ill

li

^ " Il

Il S4inl

Nonetheless, in State v. Struhs, this Court reversed the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress evidence under circumstances comparable with this matter at
hand. The facts as recited by this court are as follows:
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 3, 1995, Deputy Eileen Knighton, a deputy
paramedic with the Davis County Sheriffs Office, was patrolling North Salt Lake in a
marked sheriffs department vehicle with her partner. Deputy Knighton observed
defendant's pickup truck traveling toward a construction traveling toward a
construction area. As she continued to watch, Deputy Knighton observed the truck
turn around and back up towards barricades and a sign that read "Road Closed." Once
there, the truck was parked, and its headlights were turned off. The truck was
approximately two hundred feet away from an area where a number of construction
vehicles and equipment were located. Deputy Knighton never saw anyone leave the
truck.
Although neither party suggests the truck had been driven illegally or was parked in an
unlawful manner, Deputy Knighton stated she wondered why the pickup truck would
enter an isolated area late at night when no one was working. She also was concerned
as there had been numerous complaints of thefts in the area in the past.
Id., at 37. This Court further analyzed:
In order to justify a seizure, a police officer must "point to specific, articulable facts,
which together with rationale inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a
reasonable person to conclude [the defendant] had committed or was about to commit a
crime." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The assessment of
whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective standard based on the totality of the
circumstances in which an "officer is entitled to assess the facts in light of [her]
experience" because "a trained law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and
articulate meaning in a given conduct which would wholly innocent to die untrained
observer." IdL at 88-89.
Id., at 39. The Court then concluded:
[W]e conclude Deputy Knighton's stop of defendant was not supported by reasonable
suspicion. In the face of any number of possible innocent explanations for defendant's
behavior, there were no specific articulable objective facts that would lead a reasonable
person to suspect that criminal conduct was occurring or was about to occur.
Id., at 39. As in Struhs, in the case at hand, there are no objective facts that the officer can
specifically articulate that would lead a reasonable person to suspect that criminal activity was
12

afoot. The office

•'

-

, i.

-

i

- . •• ^ s .

claimed by the citizen. The officer could have looked the vehicle over for damage, Mr.
liimtV |»ii Is111» liiiii \v;ts a, l^'h ( lirvi'olil ihiii was only approximate! ,' a ytaj old at ihr time
of the arrest.
Furthermore, one may argue that the citizen's report is similar to an ATL.
In July 1994, this Court, in State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App.

u- ;t

for determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists in order to justify an investigative stop,
as

follows:

.

..

[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to
reasonably conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot" a brief stop and detention is justified. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88
S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); accord Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15
(1990). In other words, reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has "a
reasonable suspicion based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in
criminal activity." State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991)
(quoting, State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985)). In determining
the existence of reasonable suspicion, a court must look to the totality of the
circumstances.
I tl,

In this case, there are no observed unusual conduct.

Furthermore, in State v, Leonard, 825 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1991), this court reiterated the
standing Utah Supreme Court's position of the Fourth Amendment's application to individuals
III

I l l In S , I ' ' i l i l l l l l f . !

While an individual has a lesser expectation of privac) in a vehicle as opposed
to in his or her home, the protection of the Fourth Amendment still applies. See
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989), (citing California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 390-93,. 105 S.Ct 2066, 2068-70 (1985)).
Id. Furthermore, the Leonard Court stated that it has further refined the Terry reasonable
suspicion test, concluding:
13

[A] brief investigatory stop must be based on "objective facts" that the
"individual is involved in criminal activity." State v. Holmes 774 P.2d 506,
508 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted).
Id. The past report by the citizen does not support a belief that Mr. James was involved in a
crime at the of the officer's contact.
Also in 1994, this Court expanded the application of the reasonable suspicion
standard-upholding the trial court's verdict in State v. Nguyen, by stating:
The conduct observed and/or information relied upon need not be illegal or
describe illegal activity in order to give a law enforcement officer reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, so long as the officer can articulate facts which
form the basis for his or her suspicion. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541
(Utah App. 1990). Rather, the conduct observed must suggest to an officer, in
light of that officer's experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry,
392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884; Menke, 787 P.2d at 541.
State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 1994).
Mind you, these facts, under the totality of the circumstances, which form the
basis for the officer's suspicion must absolutely be reasonable to a level that will avoid even a
close, de novo review. In this matter, there was no objective observation to lead the officer to
believe that Mr. James had committed the offense reported to him by the citizen. No reports
through dispatch confirmed the report from other complainants, nor did the officer observe any
body damage to the vehicle.
In Nguyen,4 this Court demonstrated when the law enforcement officials
possessed enough information to satisfy the standard for reasonable suspicion. The ATL
relayed the following information to law enforcement officers: (1) the color and possible make
of the car driven by the suspects, (2) an accurate license plate number, (3) the race and gender

4

Supra.
14

of the suspects and the direction the vohn
attempting to sell large amounts of quarters wrapped in yellow notebook paper, (5) several
businc'iS nptTiilois' n pnrls iiill! i nun ins iillliiiiiiiiil iiilllii ill i in imnii i1. \ 11 I i the suspects, and (6) the
report of a recent burglary in Price, Such information could reasonably lead an officer to
coiielude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that criminal activity may be afoot. The
Court therefore upheld the conviction and ruled the trial court did
law enforcement officials had reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of defendant's vehicle.
In contrast, in State \ , Roth, H } " I1 il ""<' I' Lili , ,|>|> I

i iIn-. "« Vim liphtlJ

a conviction of Driving Under the Influence on the basis of a University of Utah Police
Office! ! s obsei \ al

:h i eporting a " • ::li i ink cii I \ s i: " In this particular case,

a university security guard observed in detail an individual who apparently was under the
influence. Ihe guard witnessed Roth trying to drive away in a red Pontiac Fiero. He further
observed that Roth repeatedly started 'the vciiiw

• u*ove a few fee t stalle • i a nd then " je i ke d to

- "*— " He then had another security officer call dispatch.
-i

*

.

•

investigate the report of an intoxicated male, driving a red Pontiac Fiero, license number
88M "SI , as reported i

p u r i t y office. The officers arrived and spotted the vehicle

matching the licence number. The officer observed that he was driving "slow and jerky'
that he "was having a hard time driving. Officer Bradfield stopped Roth's vehicle based

was denied and was subsequently convicted.
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In Roth, the dispatch issued was based on articulable facts. The dispatcher
informed the investigating officers of a "drunk driver,M not the mere possibility of a drunk
driver. See, e.g, Playle v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App.
1989). Moreover, the dispatcher provided a gender description of the driver, the make and
color of the automobile, the license number, and the vehicle's location. These articulable facts
supported the forming of reasonable suspicion by the dispatcher of the commission of an
offense that justified the transmission of the dispatch. Consequently, because specific facts
supported reasonable suspicion to prompt the dispatch, the arresting officer properly relied on
the dispatch in executing the stop. The Roth Court further stated that the dispatcher
communicated a factual foundation for the dispatch, specifically, the existence of a drunk
driver along with a description of the driver's vehicle, license number, and location. Id,
The Roth Court concluded that the police dispatch may have been the initial
impetus for the officer's suspicion that Roth was driving while intoxicated. However, Officer
Bradfield's own observations corroborated the dispatched report of a drunk driver exiting the
University Medical Center in a red Pontiac Fiero. Therefore, the officer's observations,
coupled with the police dispatch, sustain the trial court's determination that there was
reasonable suspicion to stop Roth's vehicle.
In this case, similar to these ATL dispatch cases, the officer initiated contact
with Mr. James relying solely on the citizen's report of the alleged driving pattern and the
possibility of an accident with three other vehicles. However, this is where the similarities
end. What of the tb«** whirl**? What ahnnt nWrved driving behavior? Ultimately, what
happened to the offi

support any level of reasonable
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suspicion? As explained heretofore, the Roth and Nguyen Coi n its hai e • :le te i it nined tl ic • fact
patterns on point. Firstly, the Roth Court explained three aspects they viewed in sustaining the
uing the
dispatcher's information "of a 'drunk driver,' not the mere possibility of a drunk driver." (2)
I In i il I in i mi s piopei I) lelied on the dispatch in executing the stop, il

, he dispatched report

was supported by the officers observations.
Secondly, the Nguyen Court explained the information an ATL needed to
satisfy the standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court "itntnt 111 thr i oloi iiiiiiiiiii possible
make of car driven by the suspects, (2) an accurate license plate number, (3) the race and
Ijcmlci nil Ih " Mispi'i Is •iiiicll llii" (hirm lion III , rlnch >< MS hcailm^, ("III .Ii'dnls ol lllliii: suspects'
conduct. . . , (5) several business operators' reports of concerns about their encounters with
J report of a recent burglary in Price. Such information could
reasonably lead an officer to conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances, that criminal
activity may be afoot
In this case, Officer Kendric^
Nguyen while failing to meet the objective standard required in Roth. At the time of the
:iis driveway, i he officer did not observe
any illegal conduct, nor was there a reasonable indication that he had been engaged in criminal
activity. "therefore, the officer failed to abide by Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1995) requiring
reasonable suspicion.
The Level Two stop of Mr. James violated the 4th Amendment of the I" ~
thus, illegal
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and the appropriate remedy is to suppress the evidence obtained during and following the
illegal stop.

POINT II.
THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO OPEN THE DOOR.
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) is on point with this matter. In
that case, the Utah Supreme Court rationalized:
The determinative question on the unlawful search and seizure issue is whether the
police officers were justified in opening the unlocked car door in search of the
additional VIN to verify the VIN located on the dashboard. Defendant has challenged
the lawfulness of the search under the Utah and the federal constitutions.
The court of appeals, relying on New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S. Ct. 960, 89
L. Ed. 2d 81, (1986), found defendant to have no reasonable expectation of privacy
under the federal fourth amendment in the VIN discovered after the police officers
opened the car door. State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 93-95 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The
court read Class to compel the conclusion that, because there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the VIN, there could be no search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. Id We agree with the dissent below that Class does not require
such a conclusion.
In Class, the police officer, after stopping a car for two traffic violations and after the
driver had left the car, reached into the car to move some papers that were obscuring
the area of the dashboard where the VIN was located. In so doing, he saw the handle of
a gun protruding from underneath the driver's seat. The defendant later moved to
suppress the gun as evidence on the ground that it was the result of an illegal search.
Because the focus of the alleged unconstitutional search in Class was the gun rather
than the VIN itself, the Court, while holding, that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a VIN, did not clearly articulate when one has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a VIN located inside one's automobile. In State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132
(Utah 1989), we addressed the issue of whether a police officer's opening the passenger
door for investigatory purposes constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. In
finding that such conduct was subject to fourth amendment protection, we cited Class
to stand for the proposition that a search had occurred:
[T]he Supreme Court stated that "a car's interior as a whole is... subject to
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police." The
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Court held that an officer's opening the driver's door of an automobile to
examine the vehicle identification number constituted a "search" and that the
search was justified because the officer sought only to uncover the VIN.. a
number required by state law to be located in plain view from outside the
vehicle. The Court warned, however, that "[i]f the VIN is in the plain view of
someone outside the vehicle, there is no justification for governmental intrusion
into the passenger compartment to see it."
IdL at 1135 (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 114-15, 119). We think Judge Billings of the
court of appeals was correct in her dissent:
[T]he reasoning of the Supreme Court in Class persuades me that defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN located inside his car after the
officers had read the VIN on his dashboard from outside the car and found
nothing out of the ordinary which would justify a further search.
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d at 102.
Thus, Class may fairly be lead as meaning that an officer's opening a car door to
examine a VIN on a doorjamb constitutes a search under the fourth amendment. This
view would be consistent with the view taken by Professor LaFave, who in his treatise
on search and seizure wrote with reference to Class:
|Aj u assumption that the phrase tins search* refers only to the physical
intrusion into the interior is hardly a compelling one. Nor is the matter settled
by the Court's statement that there is no privacy expectation as to the VIN on
the doorjamb, for that is also true of the dashboard VIN but yet did not stop the
Court from concluding that very limited steps to reveal that VIN still had to be
characterized as a search. Given the Supreme Court's earlier conclusion in Katz
that a physical entry into a "constitutionally protected area" is not essential in
order for there to have occurred a Fourth Amendment search, it would seem
that opening a vehicle door to see an otherwise hidden VIN is likewise a
search....
1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.5(d), at 456-57 (id ed. 198 /). Because of its
facts, Class is open to conflicting interpretations. Were we deciding this case under
federal law, we would hold that a search was conducted within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. Instead of relying on federal law, however, we analyze this
question under the Utah Constitution.
The court's analysis didn'y end there though; it went on reviewing the issue under the State
Constitution to determine that greater protection of rights was warranted. The Court stated:

In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), this court explained that because of the
similarity between article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution, we have not in the past drawn any
distinctions between the protections respectively afforded by them. Id. at 1221. We
then noted, however, that "we have by no means ruled out the possibility of doing so in
some future case" since "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens
from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
federal courts." Id at n.8. As the Washington Supreme Court stated under similar
circumstances:
Prior reliance on federal precedent and federal constitutional provisions [does]
not preclude us from taking a more expansive view of [the state constitution]
where the United States Supreme Court determines to further limit federal
guarantees in a manner inconsistent with our prior pronouncements.
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 (1984).
An increasing number of state courts are relying on an analysis of the search and
seizure provisions of their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional
protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment. See e.g., State v.
Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978); State v. McGann, 124 N.H. 101, 467 A.2d 571
(1983); People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, on
remand from New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81, 106 S. Ct. 960,
(1986); State v. Caraher, 293 Ore. 741, 653 P.2d 942 (1982); State v. Opperman, 247
N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), this court, in applying another
provision of the Utah Constitution which has a counterpart in the federal bill of rights,
showed a willingness to diverge from the United States Supreme Court's application of
the equal protection clause:
Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same general
fundamental principles as are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our
construction and application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal
courts' construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive in applying
Article I, § 24, but that law is not binding so long as we do not reach a result
that violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 670 (citations omitted); see also State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981).
Several state courts have found that conduct similar to that of the police in this case
does constitute a search. In State v. Turechek, 74 Ore. App. 228, 702 P.2d 1131,
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(1985), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a police officer "conducted a search
within the meaning of Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution when he opened
the door [of a pickup truck] to inspect the VIN." 74 Or. App. at
, 702 P.2d at
1134. In finding a search, the court quoted the Washington Supreme Court, which had
recognized in State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 184, 622 P.2d 1199, 1208 (1980),
"The degree of privacy interest in the part of the vehicle where the VIN is located is a
separate question from the extent of privacy interest in the serial number itself." State
v. Turechek, 74 Or. App. at
, 702 P.2d at 1133-34. The Supreme Court of Hawaii
has taken the view that checking an engine number which is located inside the vehicle
constitutes a search under the Hawaii Constitution. See State v. Moore, 66 Haw. 202,
659 P.2d 70 (1983); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252, 614 P.2d 393 (1980). In
addition, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held under its state constitution "that an
official inspection of a VIN which is not in plain view and which is located within the
vehicle constitutes a search." State v. McGann, 1 °4 NJ H at
Afn A 2d at 573.
I he New \ ork Court of Appeals maintained the view that the state constitution had
been violated even after the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment had not in People v. Class. More recently, in People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d
224, 543 N. E. 2d 61, 544 N. Y. S.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1989), that court elaborated on
its rationale for independent state constitutional analysis:
[W]e note that although the history and identical language of the state and
federal constitutional privacy guarantees generally support a "policy of
uniformity," this court has demonstrated its willingness to adopt more protect!\ e
standards under the state Constitution "when doing so best promotes
predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases and
the protection of the individual rights of our citizens." (People v. P.J. Video, 68
N, Y. 2d 296, 304, 508 N. Y, S. 2d 907, 501 N. E. 2d 556 (on remand)
quoting People v. Johnson, 66 N. Y. 2d 398, 497 N. Y. S. 2d 618, 488 N. E.
2d 439). Accordingly, we have in recent years carved out an independent body
of principles to govern citizen-police encounters in a number of specific
A ponce officer s entry into a citizen1" s automobile and his inspection of
personal effects located within are significant encroachments upon that citizenfs
privacy interests.... Under our own longstanding precedent, such intrusions
must be both justified in their inception and reasonably related in scope and
intensity to the circumstances which rendered their initiation permissible....
,4 .V 1.
omitted).

"

at 63-65 S44 N. Y. S. 2d at 798-800 (citations

We likewise conclude that a constitutional privacy interest exists in the interior of an
automobile and that the opening of the car door by the police officer here constituted a
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search. We now determine whether this search violated article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution. Our analysis logically begins with a consideration of the history of the
warrant requirement under the federal constitution with respect to automobile searches.
With this principle clearly in mind, its conclusive that Officer Kendricks'
actions constituted a seizure when he opened the court door much to Mr. James' surprise after
knocking on the window. The officer at this point lacked any probable cause to believe that
Mr. James was engaged in criminal activity. It wasn't until the door was opened that the
officer would be able to detect the odor of alcohol or observe the open container on the floor.
Again, there was no corroborating objective fact that the officer could formulate articulable the
belief that Mr. James had violated any offense.

POINT III.
THE OFFICER'S WARRANTLESS ARREST LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE
OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO ARREST MR. JAMES.
Once Mr. James was left by the officer, he entered his home prior to being
advised that he was under arrest.

Therefore, Article I, section 14 of the Utah State

Constitution is directly as issue of this point pertaining to his house. Article I Section 14
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.
Id. (emphasis added). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is identical in
content.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "In the absence of certain well-defined and
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement, a warrantless seizure is presumptively
unreasonable." See, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).) Furthermore, the
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government bears a heavy burden when it seeks to justify warrantless arrests and searches.
United States v. Coker, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1979).
In this case there is a warrantless entry into Mr. James' home by the arresting
officer. The officer approached Mr. James1 home with back up without a warrant, which
upsets the language contained in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993). That case
provides the following sound guidance:
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons
[and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." When police make a
seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis begins with an assessment of whether that seizure
occurred in a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). When Davis emerged briefly into the common
hallway, he had a diminished expectation of privacy, see United States v.
Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 953, 110 S. Ct.
364 (1989), and the police were therefore free to make an investigatory stop if they had
reasonable articulable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-1881, 1884 (1968). However, the
undisputed factual findings indicate that Officer Humphries reached across the
threshold of apartment 4B to seize the retreating Davis. Thus, the seizure occurred
within the constitutionally protected confines of a private residence, where citizens
enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy.
Id.

Regarding warrantless searches, the U.S. Supreme Court has further emphasized the

requirements necessary to uphold the 4th Amendment:
Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972). Consequently, warrantless searches and seizures
within a home or other private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980); Brown,
201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. "Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at
1382.
Id.
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In this case, Mr. James was in his home when the officer attempted to effect his
arrest without warrant. There was no consent to enter and furthermore, there were no exigent
circumstances to seize Mr. James. Therefore, any and all evidence gathered on this occasion
was in violation of Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution. In light of circumstances the evidence should be suppressed.
In Beavers, Judge Orme wrote:
Given the thrust of the state's argument, the primary issue before us is whether the
Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless entry into a private residence on the basis of
reasonable, articulable suspicion—the level of suspicion necessary to justify an
investigatory Terry stop—or whether such an entry is justified solely on the basis of
probable cause and exigent circumstances.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons
[and] houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." When police make a
seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis begins with an assessment of whether that seizure
occurred in a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v.
Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah 1992). When Davis emerged
briefly into the common hallway, he had a diminished expectation of privacy, see
United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S.
953, 110 S. Ct. 364 (1989), and the police were therefore free to make an
investigatory stop if they had reasonable articulable suspicion that "criminal activity
may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-1881,
1884 (1968). However, the undisputed factual findings indicate that Officer Humphries
reached across the threshold of apartment 4B to seize the retreating Davis. Thus, the
seizure occurred within the constitutionally protected confines of a private residence,
where citizens enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy.
"Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2134 (1972). Consequently, warrantless searches and seizures
within a home or other private premises are per se unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980); Brown,
201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. "Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not
reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S. Ct. at
1382.
The State bears the particularly heavy burden of proving the warrantless entry into a
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home falls within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984); State v.
Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah App. 1991). Even when exigent circumstances
exist the Fourth Amendment always requires probable cause as a basis for entry into a
private residence. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-89, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381
(1980); United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Socey, 269 U.S. App. D.C. 453, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444 n.5 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied,
488 U.S. 858, 109 S. Ct. 152 (1988). See also State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1259
(Utah 1987) (probable cause and exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into
a home). Despite this two-fold requirement for warrantless entry, the State argues that,
under the "hot pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement, entry into private
premises is permissible by merely showing police had articulable suspicion. We
disagree.
The United States Supreme Court has held "that a suspect may not defeat an arrest
which has been set in motion in a public place . . . by the expedient of escaping to a
private place." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2410
(1976). Accord State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah App. 1991). In Santana,
police had probable cause to arrest defendant on the basis of a just-completed drug buy.
Upon finding the defendant standing at the threshold to her house, in an area the Court
ruled was a public place, police attempted to stop her, whereupon she retreated into the
house. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40, 96 S. Ct. at 2408. Police followed her into the house,
seized her, and found heroin and cash with serial numbers matching that used in the
drug buy. LI at 40-41, 96 S. Ct. at 2408-09. The Court reasoned that the hot pursuit
into defendants house was justifiable because the police lawfully initiated the arrest in
a public place based on probable cause, idL at 42, 96 S. Ct. at 2409, and because there
was "a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence." Id
at 43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410.
Some courts have extended the hot pursuit doctrine to Terry stops. See, e.g., United
States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1229 (7th Cir.) (following car of would-be assassin into
his parking garage), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1030, 110 S. Ct. 3286 (1990), and, 498
U.S. 878, H I S . Ct. 210 (1990); Harbin v. City of Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 72
(E.D. Va. 1989) (police verbally stopping suspect inside house from position on front
porch), affd, 908 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1990); Edwards v. United States, 364 A.2d
1209, 1214 (D.C. App. 1976) (chasing suspects into house) (Edwards I), affd on other
grounds, 379 A.2d 976 (D.C. App. 1977) (en banc) (Edwards II); People v. Rivera,
233 111. App. 3d 69, 598 N. E. 2d 423, 428, 174 111. Dec. 226 (111. App. 1992)
(chasing suspect from public area of bar to private basement area); State v. Penas, 200
Neb. 387, 263 N. W. 2d 835, 836-37 (Neb. 1978) (traffic misdemeanor suspect pulled
from home). Of these cases, Edwards I is the most frequently cited as support for the
proposition that police may make a warrantless entry into private premises for the
purpose of completing a lawful Terry stop premised solely on reasonable suspicion.
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In Edwards I, police patrolling a residential neighborhood late at night noticed
defendant and his companion carrying electronic sound equipment and a bedsheet
stuffed with unknown goods. The sheet was marked in the manner employed by the
nursery facility attended by the son of one of the officers. Edwards I, 364 A.2d at
1212. When police approached the pair they ran. The officers chased them up a flight
of stairs and followed them through a door, which had been slammed and left
unlocked, into defendant's apartment. The Edwards I panel read the gravamen of the
Court's holding in Santana to be that when a citizen has knowingly placed himself in a
public place and valid police action is commenced in that public place, the citizen
cannot thwart that police action by then fleeing into a private place.
Id. at 1214 (emphasis added). While acknowledging that police must generally have
probable cause to make a warrantless entry into a dwelling to arrest someone or to seize
contraband, the Edward I's court viewed the facts before it "as presenting quite a
different situation requiring the application of a rule of reason" which justified the
warrantless entry. IcL
As a jurisprudential matter, we do not view Edwards I as viable precedent for the
proposition that warrantless entries into private premises can be justified solely on the
basis of reasonable suspicion. While the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed the result of Edwards I en banc, it did so by concluding that police had
probable cause to arrest defendants at the outset of the chase and their entry into the
apartment was justified under Santana. Edwards II, 379 A.2d at 978-79. Thus, the
extension of the hot pursuit doctrine to Terry stops by the Edwards I panel was
rendered dicta, at best, by the en banc decision.
More importantly, we believe the Edwards I panel misinterpreted the Santana decision.
We view the Santana Court's articulation of the hot pursuit doctrine as nothing more
than a specific application of the general rule that a warrantless entry of a private
residence must be justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Nowhere in
Santana did the Court hint it was expanding the application of this rule to circumstances
amounting to less than probable cause. In fact, as noted above, the Santana Court, by
its own language, based its decision on the facts that the police possessed probable
cause to arrest defendant and defendant's action created an exigency whereby evidence
of a serious crime would have been destroyed had police delayed their pursuit. Santana,
427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 S. Ct. at 2409-10.
By expanding the Santana exception to Terry stops, the Edwards I panel disregarded
the Supreme Court's directive that exceptions to the warrant requirement should be few
in number, carefully delineated, and jealously drawn. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 749, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2097 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah
1987). Moreover, in Welsh the Supreme Court narrowed rather than expanded
Santana's carefully delineated exception to the warrant requirement by holding that,
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despite the State's claim that potential loss of evidence constituted exigent
circumstances, police entry into a home to arrest a suspected drunk driver was
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the existence of outright probable cause, because the
suspected offense was "minor." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S. Ct. at 2099. See also
supra note 6. The Court reasoned that the government's interest in arresting defendant
for a minor offense was insufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness
attached to the warrantless search of a home. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750-754, 104 S. Ct.
at 2098-2100.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the application of Terry
principles to warrantless entries of a home, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
apparently discerning extensive discussion unnecessary, unequivocally concluded that
"the Terry analysis does not apply to intrusion into the home . . . because an
individual's residence enjoys special protection under the Fourth Amendment." United
States v. Tobin, 890 F.2d 319, 327 (11th Cir. 1989), vacated, 902 F.2d 821 (11th Cir.
1990) (en banc) (granting rehearing). Although the original panel's decision was
vacated, the Eleventh Circuit, in an en banc opinion following rehearing, noted the
original panel's view regarding extension of Terry principles and agreed that
"reasonable suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house." United States
v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (police entry into home justified
because probable cause and exigent circumstances existed), cert, denied
U.S.
,
112 S. Ct. 299 (U.S. 1991). Still another court has explicitly refused to "extend the
scope of a Terry protective search into the private recesses of one's dwelling when an
officer stands at the threshold with merely reasonable suspicion to support an
investigation." State v. Davis, 295 Ore. 227, 666 P.2d 802, 812 (Or. 1983) (en banc).
In Davis, police responded to a reported fight at a motel. IcL at 804. Upon arrival,
police were informed that there was an ongoing rape in a specific room, but when
police knocked on the door the purported victim emerged frilly clothed and apparently
unfrightened. Police talked with defendant for a moment and noticed an empty holster
protruding from a backpack on the bed. IcL The officers restrained defendant in the
motel room and in the ensuing search found a gun and drugs.
Noting that any emergency with respect to the woman had clearly ended, the Davis
court rejected the State's claims that an emergency required police to enter and search
the room for their own safety and that the search was justified on the basis of
reasonable suspicion. The court reasoned:
The state attempts to bootstrap the police officers' entry into Defendant's room
by merging two independent doctrines i.e., the stop and frisk doctrine with the
emergency doctrine, in order to fill the gaps of one doctrine with the arguably
permissible scope of another. Thus, their "emergency" or exigent circumstance,
is, in their words, the need to "neutralize" the area for their own protection
while carrying on the questioning. We decline the invitation to stretch either of
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these doctrines in order to justify the police officers' actions based on the facts
presented here. Such a modification or blending of the two doctrines would
create an exception to the warrant requirement which would effectively swallow
the rule.
Id at 812. The court concluded that extending Terry to allow police entry into private
dwellings would contradict the principle that exceptions to the search requirement be
carefully drawn. IcL
This reasoning applies to the State's argument in the present case, especially in light of
Officer Humphries's testimony that he feared for his safety once he was inside the
apartment, yet he never testified that any fear existed before entering the apartment to
seize Davis. An entirely new, expansive exception to the search warrant requirement
would arise if police could seize citizens in their homes on the basis of reasonable
suspicion, and justify further intrusions by a reasonable fear for their safety once
inside. Instead of merely expanding the "probable cause plus exigent circumstances"
exception as the state would have us believe, permitting such intrusions would create a
wholly new, untenably circular "reasonable suspicion and emergencies created by
entry" exception.
Furthermore, the rationale for permitting warrantless entries into private residences is
totally inapplicable in the Terry context. Warrantless entries are justified with probable
cause and exigent circumstances because in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a
search warrant would risk "physical harm to the officers or other persons, the
destruction of relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect." United States v.
Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Id. In this case, there is no evidence supporting the belief that there was exigent circumstances
requiring a warrantless arrest. No evidence was offered stating that an arrest at that time
would place the officers at risk of physical harm, that the destruction of relevant evidence was
likely, or that the suspect would have the opportunity to escape. The officers had no business
entering Mr. James' garage to arrest him.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. James clearly should not have been convicted if not for plain errors
committed during prosecution of this case. Both the facts and the law fail to support any
conviction of an offense by Mr. James. No evidence should have been presented to the jury at
all; it should have been suppressed prior to trial. Clearly, if there is not a basis to convict Mr.
James of Possession of an Open Container, there should be no basis to support the conviction
of Driving Under the Influence.
Therefore, this Honorable Court should vacate the order and reverse the trial
court's decision and award Mr. James his reasonable attorney fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of
April, 1998.

4y*£*cs^j%*

-

D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

Amendment IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation.

Amendment VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed; which district
sh*J1 bavp bpprj nreviotislv ascertained bv law, and

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by rlue course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal ;n this State, by himself or
counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
1896
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or
in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
January 1,1995
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. The formation of
the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the
Legislature.
January 1, 1949
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
3

warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
1896
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the
jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and
was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.
1896
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding
debtors.
1896
Sec 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time
interfere to prevent thefreeexercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war,
may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, or in
adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power, and no soldier
in time of peace, shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner;
nor in time of war except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
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